Resumen:
Many countries use auctions to select agents to which transmission concessions are awarded. Where multiple concessions are auctioned each year, there are potential benefits, for transcos and grid users, in using auction protocols allowing risk-averse bidders to explicitly consider complementary packages of transmission facilities: combinatorial & simultaneous descending auctions. We investigate the use of these protocols for transmission auctions, with aid of mixed-integer linear optimization models developed for this task and realistic case studies, while focusing on the treatment of the exposure problem.
Palabras Clave: Transmission, competitive bidding, exposure problem, combinatorial and simultaneous descending auctions.
Índice de impacto JCR y cuartil WoS: 6,807 - Q1 (2018); 6,600 - Q1 (2022)
Referencia DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2017.2766127
Publicado en papel: Julio 2018.
Publicado on-line: Octubre 2017.
Cita:
R.S. Ferreira, C.L.T. Borges, L.A. Barroso, Combinatorial and simultaneous descending auctions for electricity transmission concessions. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. Vol. 33, nº. 4, pp. 4111 - 4123, Julio 2018. [Online: Octubre 2017]
